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NOTES

Resolving the Threat of Ambiguity by
Defining a Threat to Violate the
Fourth Amendment under Kentucky v.
King
INTRODUCTION
It is 9:00 P.M. you just got home from work and are
about to enjoy a late dinner with your family. You join your
family at the dinner table and strike up conversation with your
daughter as she eagerly tells you about what happened today
at school. Suddenly, she is interrupted by the ear-piercing
screech of car tires on the street outside. You jump up and look
out the window. It is dark, but you can see the silhouette of a
man in a hooded jacket as he sprints across your front lawn,
hops your fence, and disappears into the night. His car is left
behind: the headlights are on, the engine is running, and the
driver’s door is wide open. A trail of swerving skid marks leads
to the car’s resting place: two tires remain on the street, and
the other two are dug into the dirt on your front lawn. Panic
sets in as you lock the bolt to the front door.
You return to the table, but as you sit down, the sound
of approaching sirens and the glow of flashing lights fill the
room. Seconds later, you hear the sound of people rushing
toward your front door . . . Bang! Bang! Bang! Someone slams
on the door, and a man screams, “Police! Police! Police!” You sit
still and remain silent. You have never talked to a police officer
before, and you are terrified. Another man screams, “We know
you’re in there! Open up or else!” You do not know what “open
up or else” really means, but you know that these officers
1487
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sound angry as they pound on your door. At this point, have
the police threatened to enter your home?
You then look out the window and see another officer
running toward your home with a large door-breaching
battering ram. You hear the distinct sound of metal-on-metal
as the ram is placed up against your door. An officer yells, “We
know you’re in there, this is your last chance!” You do not know
what it is your “last chance” for, but you know that battering
ram can break down your door in a matter of seconds. At this
point, have the police threatened to enter your home? What
statements are sufficient to be considered a threat to enter?
Can a threat be implied, or must a threat be explicitly clear?
These are crucial questions both for law enforcement
officers and for citizens who may be subject to police search.
Since the Supreme Court decided Kentucky v. King, lower
courts across the country have struggled to apply its holding
regarding threatened Fourth Amendment violations.1 This note
will seek to provide clarity to that issue.
Kentucky v. King addressed a dramatic circuit split
regarding the doctrine of “police-created exigencies” and its
application to warrantless searches and seizures.2 To
understand the complex puzzle that the Court attempted to
piece together in King, we must begin with a brief explanation
of the puzzle’s individual pieces. The Constitution grants
citizens protection for their “legitimate expectations of privacy”3

1

Compare United States v. Estrada, No. 1:11-CR-101 TS, 2012 WL 2367992,
at *6 (D. Utah June 21, 2012) (finding that police officers’ attempt to enter hotel room
with a key card constituted a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment), with People v.
Cervantes, No. A131298, 2012 WL 2055106, at *2, *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2012)
(holding that police officers did not impermissibly threaten to violate the Fourth
Amendment by banging loudly on defendant’s door and using key to enter).
2
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 091272), 2010 WL 1626437. The Petition states:
This Court has carved out exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement, but has never determined whether police can create the exigent
circumstances then used to justify a warrantless entry under those
exceptions. As a consequence, the lower courts have been debating the issue
for over forty years, resulting in a dramatic split among the circuits and an
improper narrowing of the exceptions.
Id. at *9 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
3
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). In determining whether an
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Court applies a two part test: (1)
the individual must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation
is one that society views as objectively reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a list of police conduct that has been held
to not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness
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within the home.4 The Fourth Amendment protects these
expectations by “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials.”5 These safeguards, including the general requirement
that police must obtain a warrant before searching a home,6 are
a means of ensuring that searches are “authorized by law
and . . . limited in . . . scope.”7
Over the years, the Court has carved out several limited
exceptions to the warrant requirement that enable the
government to conduct warrantless searches of the home.8 These
exceptions (called “exigent circumstances”) recognize the reality
that the needs of law enforcement may be “so compelling that [a]
warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”9 These exceptions
come at a price, however, as they shift discretion away from an
impartial judge and place it directly in the hands of law
enforcement in the field.10 As a result, defendants occasionally
and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 153, 160-62 (2008).
4
The protection of privacy within the home is “at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999); see Craig M. Bradley, “Knock
and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099, 1100-04 (2009). Bradley
argues that the Court has historically placed special emphasis on Fourth Amendment
protections within the home. Bradley states that the “concern for privacy in the home
is, of course, at the root of the Fourth Amendment itself.” Id. at 1101.
5
Camara v. Mun. Court of City and Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
6
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).
7
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989) (noting that
the warrant requirement ensures that the search is not a “random or arbitrary”
intrusion by the government).
8
See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (concluding that a
warrantless entry is justified to give aid when police found property damage and blood,
and observed a man inside a home yelling); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006) (concluding that a warrantless entry is justified “to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (concluding that
a warrantless entry is justified to render emergency aid to an individual in need);
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 38-39 (1976) (concluding that a warrantless
entry is justified when the police are in “hot pursuit” of a suspect).
9
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals only
from unreasonable searches and seizures, not a warrantless search in general. See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. Therefore, under a legitimate exigent circumstance, a warrantless
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures because the search has become objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394.
10
This concern arises because of the “importance of informed, detached and
deliberate determinations” as to whether a search is reasonable. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (discussing the search of one’s own body); see
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221-22 (1981) (“In the absence of exigent
circumstances, we have consistently held that such judicially untested determinations
are not reliable enough to justify an entry into a person’s home to arrest him without a
warrant . . . .”); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964) (“An evaluation of the
constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that ‘the informed and
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be
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accuse law enforcement of improperly creating or
manufacturing the circumstances that lead to the exigency as a
means to circumvent the warrant requirement.11
To curb the risk of abuse of the exigent-circumstance
doctrine, courts across the nation adopted the police-created
exigency doctrine.12 This doctrine precludes application of the
exigent-circumstance doctrine, which serves to render a
warrantless search of a home objectively reasonable, when the
exigency that justified the warrantless search resulted from
actions taken by law enforcement and not the free will of the
suspect.13 Thus, if the police created the exigency, then the
exigent-circumstance exception to the warrant requirement is
inapplicable and the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
preferred over the hurried action of officers . . . who may happen to make arrests.’”
(quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (alterations in original));
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s]
protection consists in requiring that [inferences from evidence] be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime.”). For further information regarding the
potential issues with evading the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, see
Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531 (1997).
Holly notes that both the Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress have “eroded the warrant
requirement” of the Fourth Amendment by “weaken[ing] . . . restrictions on the power of the
government to [enter a citizen’s home] without a warrant.” Id. at 532. Holly refers to the
erosion of the warrant requirement as a “frontal assault upon Fourth Amendment rights,”
and warns that the shift away from strict Fourth Amendment protections jeopardizes the
security of citizens from “overzealous and arbitrary police action.” Id. at 534. Holly argues
that the Court should enforce a strict “warrant requirement and examine warrantless
searches with strict scrutiny.” Id. at 540.
11
In these instances, victims of an alleged improper warrantless search or
seizure claim that the conduct of law enforcement officials, not the conduct of the
occupant, prompted the warrantless search. See, e.g., United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d
361 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding police officers impermissibly created the exigency where the
officers repeatedly knocked on the accused’s hotel room door under false pretenses and
then entered the room without a warrant after announcing themselves as police
officers and hearing rustling and toilet flushing).
12
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (citing United States v.
Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990)).
13
Id. As the Court explained,
Under [the police-created exigency] doctrine, police may not rely on the
[exigent circumstance] when that exigency was “created” or “manufactured”
by the conduct of the police. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d
563, 566 (C.A.6 2005) (“[F]or a warrantless search to stand, law enforcement
officers must be responding to an unanticipated exigency rather than simply
creating the exigency for themselves”); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578,
590 (C.A.5 2004) (en banc) (“[A]lthough exigent circumstances may justify a
warrantless probable cause entry into the home, they will not do so if the
exigent circumstances were manufactured by the agents” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Id.
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Prior to Kentucky v. King, several Circuit Courts of Appeals
across the nation agreed that the police-created exigency
doctrine required a showing of “something more than mere proof
that fear of detection by the police caused the [exigency].”14 The
circuits differed, however, on how they applied the doctrine.15
This circuit split prompted the Court to grant certiorari in
Kentucky v. King.16
The Supreme Court decided Kentucky v. King on May
16, 2011.17 The Court attempted to balance the need for
investigative efficiency with the protections of citizens’ Fourth
Amendment privacy rights18 and held that the exigentcircumstance doctrine “applies when the police do not gain entry
to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”19 Therefore, a warrantless search is
14

Id.
Compare King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2010)
(adopting the following two-part test: (1) “courts must determine ‘whether the officers
deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the
warrant requirement;’” and (2) where police have not acted in bad faith, courts must
determine “‘[w]hether, regardless of good faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the
investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances
relied upon to justify a warrantless entry.’ If so, then the exigent circumstances cannot
justify the warrantless entry.” (citations omitted)), and Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d 826,
834 (Ark. 2004) (in adopting a foreseeability test, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
stated “[w]hether, regardless of good faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the
investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances
relied upon to justify a warrantless entry”), with Gould, 364 F.3d at 590 (stating the
test as (1) “whether the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the
bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement”; and (2) “even if they did not do so
in bad faith, whether their actions creating the exigency were sufficiently unreasonable
or improper as to preclude dispensation with the warrant requirement”), Ewolski v.
City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2002) (simply requiring some showing of
police conduct indicating an intent to avoid the warrant requirement), United States v.
Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990) (requiring an inquiry into “the
reasonableness and propriety of the investigative tactics that generated the exigency,”
and rejecting the requirement that the police officers acted in “bad faith”), and United
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that law enforcement
officials “do not impermissibly create the exigency” so long as the officials “act in an
entirely lawful manner”).
16
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (granting certiorari in part).
17
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
18
Id. at 1862. When deciding whether warrantless entry is justified, the
Court essentially balances the privacy rights granted by the Fourth Amendment with
the need for investigative efficiency. In Mincey v. Arizona, for example, the Court noted
that the investigation of a crime would be simple if warrants were not required;
however, the Fourth Amendment reflects the view that the privacy of an individual’s
home may not be completely disregarded for the sake of “maximum simplicity in
enforcement of the criminal law.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see also
Steven B. Dow, “Step Outside, Please”: Warrantless Doorway Arrests and the Problem of
Constructive Entry, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 7, 8-10 (2010) (noting that the
“reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires the balancing of an
individual’s privacy rights and “the interest of the public in effective law enforcement”).
19
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (emphasis added).
15
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impermissible when law enforcement violates, or threatens to
violate, the Fourth Amendment “prior to the exigency.”20
This note argues that the rule in Kentucky v. King is
fatally vague. A long line of case law defines how law
enforcement may actually violate the Fourth Amendment,21 yet
the Court has never defined how law enforcement can threaten
to violate the Fourth Amendment.22 This note argues that the
proper test for analyzing an alleged threatened violation should
place reasonableness—a core justification for the exigent
circumstance doctrine23—at the heart of the analysis. This test
fills the gaps in Kentucky v. King by accounting for both explicit
and implied threats and determines that a threat can be implied
through words, conduct, or a combination of both.
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of the
Fourth Amendment, exigent circumstances, and the policecreated exigency doctrine. Part II discusses the facts and
holding of Kentucky v. King, paying specific attention to the
Court’s analysis and reasoning. Part III exposes the ambiguity
of the scope of a threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment
in Kentucky v. King. Part IV discusses the distinction between
an actual and a threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment
and proposes that the lower courts should adopt an objective
reasonableness approach in defining the scope of a threatened
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Part V argues that the test
proposed in Part IV flows directly from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, adheres to the Court’s holding in Kentucky v.
King, and resolves some of the Court’s primary concerns
surrounding the doctrine.
20

Id. at 1863 (emphasis added) (holding that a warrantless search was
justified “[b]ecause the officers . . . did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth
Amendment prior to the exigency”).
21
For a description of an “actual” violation of the Fourth Amendment, see
infra Part IV.A.
22
See generally King, 131 S. Ct. 1849. Justice Alito’s opinion did not set out
clear guidelines for determining whether a threatened violation of the Fourth
Amendment is present; the opinion contained merely one additional example:
[The officers’] conduct was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
and we are aware of no other evidence that might show that the officers
either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so (for example, by
announcing that they would break down the door if the occupants did not
open the door voluntarily).
Id. at 1863.
23

Id. at 1856 (holding that the exigent-circumstance doctrine attaches when
the circumstances make the “needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (alteration
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 )).
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More specifically, this note proposes that in applying
Kentucky v. King, the lower courts should employ a test I refer
to as the “Reasonably Interpreted Threat test.” The Reasonably
Interpreted Threat test states that a threat to violate the Fourth
Amendment includes (1) any assertion by a government official
(through words or conduct), (2) that expresses an intent to act in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, (3) when viewed
objectively24 under the totality of the circumstances. The
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test accounts for explicit and
implied threats to violate the Fourth Amendment,25 thus
rebutting a potential interpretation of the Court’s holding in
Kentucky v. King. This note argues that the Reasonably
Interpreted Threat test is consistent with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence because it preserves the reasonableness
requirement—the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment”26—and
adopts the Court’s preference for purely objective review.27
This note focuses on the meaning of a “threatened
violation” of the Fourth Amendment in the context of the home
and deals only with one exigent circumstance: the prevention of
the imminent destruction of evidence.28 This note does not
address the conduct of the victim of the alleged Fourth
Amendment violation, nor does it address whether that conduct
24

“Objectively” in this instance means without regard to the subjective intentions or
state of mind of law enforcement. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining objective as “[o]f, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as
opposed to an individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions.”).
25
For the definition of an implied threat within the context of this note, see
infra note 99. For a description of how the test accounts for implied threats, see infra
Part IV.B.
26
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).
27
See generally Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). While analyzing
the approaches adopted by the circuit courts, Justice Alito articulated many issues
associated with subjective components. For example, when discussing the subjective
bad faith standard, Justice Alito noted that the Court has never held that “outside
limited contexts . . . an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1859 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 812 (1996)). Justice Alito stated that “a reasonable foreseeability test would also
introduce an unacceptable degree of unpredictability” that would be plagued with
difficulty for both the courts and law enforcement officials alike. Id. Moreover, Justice
Alito notes that a good investigative tactics “approach fails to provide clear guidance
for law enforcement officers . . . .” Id. at 1861; see also Eric F. Citron, Right and
Responsibility in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Problem With Pretext, 116
YALE L.J. 1072, 1077-76 (2007) (noting that an objective approach has been “at the
heart” of Fourth Amendment cases for the past two decades, and that the Court refuses
to look into the subjective intent of law enforcement).
28
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (recognizing the
prevention of imminent destruction of evidence as a valid exigency exception to the
warrant requirement).
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was sufficient to invoke the exigency; rather, this note only aims
to address the conduct of law enforcement and its role in the
police-created exigency doctrine.
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP

In the 1943 case West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,29 Justice Jackson stated, “[t]he very purpose of a
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.”30 In doing so, “[o]ne’s
right to life, liberty, and property . . . and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote[.]”31 One subject withdrawn
from the “vicissitudes of political controversy” is the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”32 This right, however, has been a topic of great debate
in the courts, challenging legal minds for decades.33
The Fourth Amendment has its roots in a line of
English common law that recognized an individual’s home as
“his castle,”34 irrespective of how extravagant or decrepit that
home may have been.35 In preserving this notion, the Court has
29

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 638.
31
Id.
32
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . .”).
33
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004). Kerr
states that scholars have “describe[d] Fourth Amendment law as unruly,” with few
principles that are actually agreed upon. Id. Kerr states that “trying to understand the
Fourth Amendment is a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle with several
incorrect pieces: no matter which way you try to assemble it, a few pieces won’t fit.” Id.
34
Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (Q.B.) (“That the house of
every one is to him as his Castle and Fortress, as well for his defense against injury
and violence, as for his repose.”); see also Evan B. Citron, Say Hello and Wave Goodbye:
The Legitimacy of Plain View Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2761, 2779 (2006). Citron notes that the idea of affording substantial protection to
the home was “established as early as 1604,” and that “[t]he precept that a man’s house
is his castle is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted principles in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Citron also notes that the
“sacred and special nature” of residential privacy “was of critical importance to the
founders.” Id.
35
Dow, supra note 18, at 8.
30

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.

2013]

DEFINING A THREAT

1495

identified that the Fourth Amendment creates a supreme zone
of privacy36 “free from unreasonable government intrusion.”37 As a
result, the Court has drawn a “firm line” at the entrance of the
home,38 requiring that a warrant “generally” must be obtained to
conduct a search.39 The Court presumes that warrantless searches
are “per se unreasonable”40 and treats any search conducted by the
government as an inherent invasion of privacy.41
The exigent circumstances doctrine carves out several
exceptions to the warrant requirement.42 Since the “touchstone

Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
36
See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (“The Fourth Amendment protects the
individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s
home.”). The Court in Payton indicated that “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house,” further illustrating the strong emphasis placed by
the Court on Fourth Amendment protections within the home. Id. at 590.
37
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“[P]rivate residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant . . . .”); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)
(“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed . . . .”).
38
Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line
at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”).
39
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (noting that “although the
text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify exactly when a warrant must be
obtained, th[e] Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured”); Payton,
445 U.S. at 576 (1980); see also Investigation and Police Practices, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN.
REV. CRIM. PROC. 3 (Simon Latcovich & Erin Murphy eds., 2006) (noting that,
“interpreted literally,” the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly require a warrant for
every search or seizure; however, “the Supreme Court imposes a presumptive warrant
requirement”).
40
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that searches
“conducted outside the judicial process” are “per se unreasonable”). The Court in
Acevedo further noted that the warrant requirement is “subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Payton, 445 U.S.
at 586 (1980) (holding that “a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” is that
“searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).
41
Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 39, at 5 (2006) (“A search is a
governmental invasion of a person’s privacy.”).
42
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (noting that
warrantless entry may be justified “to fight a fire and investigate its cause, to prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence, or to engage in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect”
(citations omitted)). The Court in Kentucky v. King recognized the legitimacy of these
exceptions. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856. For example, the Court indicated that law
enforcement may enter a home without a warrant to render “emergency aid.” Id. (citing
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403).
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of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,”43 the justification
behind the exigent circumstances doctrine is that in certain
instances, “the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable . . . .”44 The
doctrine is thus a narrowly tailored, Court-created list of
circumstances that are pre-determined to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.45
The exigency at issue in Kentucky v. King was the
prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence,46 which
enables the warrantless search of a home upon law enforcement’s
reasonable belief that the destruction of evidence is imminent.47
The Court has long recognized the necessity of this exigency48
because police frequently face “now or never” scenarios49 that
43

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (2006).
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (second alteration in original) (citing Mincey, 437
U.S. at 394).
45
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (1967) (holding that warrantless searches should
be “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). It is
important to note, however, that warrantless searches and seizures conducted under
the exigent-circumstance doctrine are still subject to review by the courts. A court may
review a warrantless search or seizure to determine whether or not an exigency
actually existed, and whether or not the search or seizure was appropriate under the
circumstances. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (holding that a search must
be strictly limited to the exigencies of the situation).
46
See generally King, 131 S. Ct. 1849.
47
See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40
(1963)). The Court has placed several constraints on this exigency before a failure to
obtain a warrant would be justified. First, the time constraints of obtaining a warrant
must have been sufficiently burdensome to the investigation. See McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). In McDonald, the Court noted that the suspect was
under surveillance by law enforcement for months, and that during this time, a search
warrant could have been obtained. Id. at 454-55. The Court further remarked that it
would not allow the “constitutional barrier that protects the privacy of the individual to
be hurdled so easily.” Id. at 455. Second, a warrantless search will not be justified if the
police could have taken less intrusive action to prevent the destruction of evidence
while waiting for a warrant to be issued. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 5152 (1951) (holding warrantless search was not justified when officers admitted that
they could have prevented the destruction or removal of evidence by guarding a hotel
room door and restricting entry); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001)
(holding that a seizure by guarding the defendant’s home and restricting his entry
until a warrant was obtained was lawful; the police had probable cause to believe that
evidence was inside the trailer home, and the police had good reason to believe that, if
defendant was permitted to enter, he would destroy the evidence). Finally, a
warrantless search of a home will typically be unjustified where the offense being
investigated is “minor.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding that the
presumption of unreasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure is particularly
hard to overcome for minor offenses, and stating that “the gravity of the underlying
offense” is an important factor to consider).
48
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403).
49
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973) (observing that in “exigent
circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the
evidence of the crime,” warrantless search and seizure is reasonable); see also
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (noting that an officer may reasonably believe that, under
44
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require quick action to prevent the destruction of tangible
evidence. Under these circumstances, it would be “foolish” for
the police to take the time to secure a warrant.50 Because
tangible evidence is preferable for investigative accuracy,51 the
Court has justified this exception on the expectation that it
would result in more guilty individuals being prosecuted and
more innocent individuals going free.52 Adding to its importance,
this exigency frequently permits warrantless searches53 in
narcotics cases because “drugs [can] be easily . . . flush[ed] . . .
down a toilet or rins[ed] . . . down a drain.”54
Though well-established in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the destruction of evidence exigency presents
unique issues under the police-created exigency doctrine that
troubled the lower courts prior to Kentucky v. King.55 These
difficulties result from the fact that the police, in some way,
always create the exigency in destruction of evidence cases,56
the circumstances, “the delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . threatens the
destruction of evidence” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 768 (1994) (“In a wide range of fast-breaking situations—hot pursuits, crimes in
progress, and the like—a warrant requirement would be foolish. Recognizing this, the
modern Supreme Court has carved out an ‘exigent circumstances exception’ to its socalled warrant requirement.”).
51
See Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible
Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1971) (indicating that “tangible evidence has acquired
a reputation as a trustworthy—and ‘scientific’— method of proving guilt”). The note
states that there is often a high price to pay for acquiring such tangible evidence: the
invasion of the security of the home. Id. at 1465.
52
Id. (indicating that if law enforcement is forced to turn to less tangible
forms of evidence, such as witness statements, there is an increased possibility that
“the innocent will be convicted and the guilty go free”).
53
Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 39, at 71-72 (noting that,
because narcotics may be easily destroyed, narcotic investigations often lead to
warrantless searches or seizures based on exigent circumstances); see also King, 131 S.
Ct. at 1857 (“Destruction of evidence issues probably occur most frequently in drug
cases because drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing
them down a drain.”).
54
See, e.g., State v. Linder, 190 N.W.2d 91, 92 (Minn. 1971). In Linder, law enforcement
officials entered an apartment and observed a person run into the bathroom and flush
the toilet. Id. The officials fished narcotics out of the toilet while it was being flushed.
Id.; see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (noting that narcotics may
be “easily destroyed”); Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A
New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 702
(1993) (recognizing the “inherent disposability” of narcotic substances).
55
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
56
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278,
1284 (8th Cir. 1990)). The destruction of evidence exigency is therefore unique in that
suspects destroy evidence almost always because of police behavior. This is different
from other exigencies, like the emergency aid exigency, where law enforcement can
enter a home without a warrant for a multitude of reasons other than those prompted
mainly by police activity (such as fighting a fire or preventing a suspect from harming
another individual).
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given that individuals have little reason to destroy valuable
narcotics unless attempting to prevent them from “fall[ing] into
the hands of law enforcement.”57 This dilemma presented the
courts with the daunting task of drafting a workable test for the
police-created exigency doctrine that preserves the wellestablished destruction of evidence exigency58 while remaining
capable of determining exactly when the police impermissibly
manufactured the exigency. As a precondition to invoking the
police-created exigency doctrine, the lower courts generally
required a showing of “something more than mere proof that
fear of detection by the police caused the destruction of
evidence.”59 The circuit split arose, however, in defining what
constituted “something more.”60 A clear and workable rule for
the police-created exigency doctrine was needed, and the Court
took on this challenge in Kentucky v. King.
II.

KENTUCKY V. KING

A.

The Facts

In October 2005, police officers set up a “controlled
buy”61 of narcotics at an apartment complex.62 When the sale at
issue was complete, several officers received a signal to move in
and arrest the suspect.63 The officers in pursuit received a
description of the suspect, whom they were told “entered a
specific breezeway at the apartment complex.”64 Because there
57

Id.; see also Grant T. Herrin, O! Say Can You Smell? Drug Smell Test
Taskforces: Police-Created Exigency Doctrine no Longer a Check on Warrantless Search
by Police, 39 S.U. L. REV. 343, 358 (“[B]ecause illegal drugs are so valuable but so easily
disposed of, criminals in possession of drugs will not likely destroy them unless they
expect the drugs will fall into the hands of the police.”).
58
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857.
59
Id. The Court in King noted that if simple causation was sufficient,
warrantless entry in the destruction of evidence cases would almost always be
precluded and would thus swallow the exception. Id.
60
Id. (“[T]he lower courts have held that the police-created exigency doctrine
requires more than simple causation, but the lower courts have not agreed on the test
to be applied.”). For a list of the varying tests for the police-created exigency doctrine
prior to Kentucky v. King, see supra note 15.
61
For a description of a “controlled buy,” see State v. Walker, 444 A.2d 277,
284 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (“A ‘controlled [buy]’ has been defined as ‘providing money to
a buyer, who is searched before and after making contact with the seller,’ and ‘[i]t also
involves police surveillance of as much of the transaction between buyer and seller as
possible.’” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hawkins, 278 N.W.2d 750, 751
(Minn. 1979)).
62
King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Ky. 2010).
63
Id.
64
Id.
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were several apartments in that breezeway, the officers did not
know which apartment the suspect entered.65 As they entered the
breezeway, the officers noticed a strong odor of burnt marijuana
coming from an apartment.66 Believing that the suspect must have
entered this apartment, “the officers banged on the . . . door ‘as
loud as [they] could’ and announced, ‘This is the police’ or ‘Police,
police, police.’”67 The officers then heard people moving inside and
what sounded like “things . . . being moved inside the
apartment,”68 which led the officers to believe that the apartment’s
occupants were destroying evidence.69 As a result, the officers then
“explained to [the suspects that the police] were going to make
entry inside the apartment,”70 kicked in the door, and performed a
“protective sweep” of the apartment.71 They found three people—
including King—and discovered marijuana, cocaine, crack
cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and money.72 Realizing that the
respondent was not their original suspect, the officers then
entered the apartment on the right of the breezeway and located
the “initial target of their investigation.”73
B.

The Path to the Supreme Court

Kentucky v. King’s path to the Supreme Court began at
trial when the respondent filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained during the warrantless search. The Fayette
County Circuit Court denied the motion, holding that the
warrantless search was justified under the exigent-circumstance

65

See id. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that one officer attempted to
alert the officers in pursuit that the suspect had entered “the back right apartment;”
however, the pursuing officers were no longer near their car radio, and never heard
this message. Id. The pursuing officers simply heard a door “slam shut.” Id.
66
Id.
67
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011) (quoting Joint Appendix at 2223, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (No. 09-1272), 2010 WL 4628574, at *22, *23.
68
Joint Appendix, supra note 67, at 24.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 25. For a description of a “protective sweep,” see Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 327, 335 (1990). A “protective sweep” is a search conducted for the
purpose of protecting the arresting officer. Id. at 335. It is not a complete and
comprehensive search of a premise; rather, a “protective sweep” is merely a “cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” Id. The search should last no
longer than the amount of time necessary to “dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger
and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the
premises.” Id. at 336.
72
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011).
73
See id. at 1855.
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doctrine.74 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court’s ruling on the grounds that the “police reasonably
believed that evidence would be destroyed”75 and held that the
police “did not impermissibly create the exigency . . . because
they did not deliberately evade the warrant requirement.”76 The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, and adopted a two-part test
to determine when police impermissibly create the exigency.77
First, the court looked to whether the police created the exigency
with a bad faith intent of evading the warrant requirement.78
Second, the court considered whether it was “reasonably
foreseeable” that the police tactics would create an exigency.79
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the police impermissibly
created the exigency because the destruction of evidence was a
“reasonably foreseeable” response to the officers’ conduct.80 The
United States Supreme Court recognized the nationwide conflict
regarding the police-created exigency doctrine and granted
certiorari81 to determine when “impermissibly created exigent
circumstances exist.”82
C.

Analysis and Holding

The Court recognized the legitimacy of both the
destruction of evidence exigency83 and the police-created
exigency doctrine,84 setting out only to determine how these
doctrines interact.85 Through repetition and emphasis, Justice
Alito’s majority opinion focused extensively on the question of
74

Id. The Circuit Court held that the warrantless search was justified
because the officer’s knocking was unanswered, and the police “heard movement in the
apartment which he reasonably concluded were persons in the act of destroying evidence,
particularly narcotics because of the smell.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
75
Id.
76
Id. The circuit court essentially applied a bad faith test, requiring the
officers to deliberately evade the warrant requirement. Id.
77
King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 649, 655-57 (Ky. 2010).
78
Id. at 656.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 61 (Sept.
28, 2010) (No. 09-1272) (granting certiorari only to “Question 1” in the petition).
82
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 09-1272)
(2011). Question 1 of the Petition is as follows: “When does lawful police action
impermissibly ‘create’ exigent circumstances which preclude warrantless entry; and
which of the five tests currently being used by the United States Courts of Appeals is
proper to determine when impermissibly created exigent circumstances exist?” Id.
83
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
84
Id. at 1857 (citing United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005)).
85
Id. at 1862-63 (“We decide only the question . . . on which we granted
certiorari: Under what circumstances do police impermissibly create an exigency?”).
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reasonableness.86 The proper test for the police-created exigency
doctrine flows directly from such reasonableness,87 the very
justification for the exigency doctrine itself.88 Therefore,
warrantless entry is justified under the exigent circumstance
doctrine when “the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is
reasonable in the same sense.”89 The Court held that the “exigent
circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to
premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”90 The Court thus adopted an objective test91
that requires a showing of more than simple causation,92 placing
its sole emphasis on the reasonableness of police action prior to
the exigency.93
III.

AMBIGUITY IN KENTUCKY V. KING: THE MEANING OF A
“THREATENED VIOLATION”

The Court purports to have created a workable legal
standard that provides “ample protection for the privacy rights
that the [Fourth] Amendment protects.”94 The troubling reality,
86

Id. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. The Court noted that
warrantless searches in the home are presumptively unreasonable; that this
presumption may be overcome because the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness”; and that the warrant requirement is subject to reasonable exceptions. Id.
87
See id. at 1858 (indicating that “warrantless searches are allowed when the
circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to
dispense with the warrant requirement”).
88
See id. at 1857-58 (“Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts,
the answer . . . follows directly and clearly from the principle that permits warrantless
searches in the first place.”).
89
Id. (emphasis added).
90
Id. at 1862.
91
The test is objective in this context because it does not account for the
subjective intentions or beliefs of law enforcement.
92
Under the Court’s rule, police conduct may still in a way cause the
exigency; however, more than simple causation is required to show that the exigency
was impermissibly created by the police. See id. at 1858 (holding that a warrantless
search is justified when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). For example, if police smell burning opium
outside an apartment, and knock on the door, an individual inside may be prompted to
get up and flush the opium down a toilet. By knocking, the police essentially caused the
suspect inside to destroy the evidence, yet the police did not impermissibly cause the
suspect to destroy the evidence because their behavior prior to the destruction was
reasonable. See id. at 1862 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police simply
knock on a suspect’s door because the police are doing no more than a private citizen
might do; the occupant does not have to answer the door, and the occupant doesn’t have
to let the police in).
93
After indicating that warrantless searches are justified when the
circumstances make it reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court stated that
“the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the
police preceding the exigency is reasonable . . . .” King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (emphasis added).
94
Id. at 1862.
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however, is that the Court failed to clearly define what actually
constitutes a “threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”95
This ambiguity poses a threat to the very principles that the
Court sought to protect and uphold. Without a clearer
understanding of the conduct that invokes the police-created
exigency doctrine, lower courts and police are left playing a
guessing game with the constitutionally protected privacy rights
of our nation’s citizens.
Despite the ambiguity as to what constitutes a
“threatened violation,” the Court did provide two simple
examples of how the test may be applied. The first example
comes from the Court’s analysis of the facts in Kentucky v. King.
From this analysis, we know that if police bang on a door “as
loud as [they] c[an]” and yell “Police, Police, Police,” or “this is
the Police,” they have not threatened to violate the Fourth
Amendment.96 By contrast, the Court also observed that a
threatened Fourth Amendment violation occurs when officers
“announc[e] that they [will] break down the door if the
occupants [do] not open the door voluntarily.”97
In the absence of any clear rule on the meaning of
“threat,” these two examples offer little guidance for the lower
courts in determining the scope of a threatened violation of the
Fourth Amendment.98 This ambiguity is especially troubling as
lower courts attempt to determine whether a threat to violate
the Fourth Amendment must be expressly made or whether an
implied threat99 will suffice.100 The second example provided by
95

See generally id. Nowhere in the Court’s holding is a “threatened violation
of the Fourth Amendment” clearly defined. Instead, the Court reiterates that simply
knocking on the door of a private residence and asking to speak to the people within
does not constitute such a threat. Id. at 1862; see also Herrin, supra note 57, at 376 (“It
is clear that the police could act unreasonably should they violate the Fourth
Amendment with an unlawful search . . . prior to the announcement of their presence.
However, after announcing their presence, it becomes exponentially difficult to
determine how and when law enforcement can act unreasonably.” (footnote omitted)).
96
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863 (first alteration in original). The Court stated that
“[t]his conduct was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
97
Id.; see also Herrin, supra note 57, at 361 (“[T]he only instance the High
Court gave when police could violate the Fourth Amendment in this situation was if
the police had announced they would break down the door if King had not opened it.”).
98
The Court failed to indicate whether an implied threat is sufficient, or
whether the police must expressly threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment. King,
131 S. Ct. 1849.
99
Within the context of this note, an express threat is a clear and explicit
verbal communication of an unambiguous Fourth Amendment violation. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “express” as “[c]learly and unmistakably
communicated; directly stated”). Likewise, an implied threat is conduct other than
express verbal communication of a Fourth Amendment violation that can be deemed a
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 770 (defining “implied” as “[n]ot
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the Court deals only with an explicit threat, given that
breaking down a door would clearly result in a Fourth
Amendment violation where no exigency exists.101 The Court
does not, however, address the applicability of implied threats
under their rule. On its face, the rule itself appears to permit
implied threats simply because it does not exclude them.102 On
the contrary, the Court suggested an unwillingness to account
for implied threats by rejecting the respondent’s proposed test,
which would have accounted for tone of voice and forcefulness
of knocks in determining whether the police created the
exigency.103 As the smoke from this constitutional battle clears,

directly expressed”). For examples of potential implied threats, see 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.5(b) (5th
ed. 2012). LaFave suggests that a threat may be implied when police bang on a door,
announce their presence, and then state “we know you’ve got drugs in there” or “we
want to search your apartment.” Id. LaFave also suggests that “persistent banging”
and announcing “This is the police” over an extended period of time may be sufficient to
constitute a threat. Id.
100
See id. LaFave takes note of the ambiguity inherent in Kentucky v. King,
especially when attempting to determine how “specific” a threat must be to constitute a
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. LaFave notes that the Court’s
opinion in King “leaves plenty of room for mischief” among the lower courts in
determining the scope of a threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Rachel
Levick specifically questioned this ambiguity, stating that “[w]here police implicitly
demand entry to a home, the doctrine does not make clear whether the resulting exigency
would be police-created or not . . . .” Rachel Levick, Note, “Knock, Listen, Then Break the
Door Down”? The Police-Created Exigency Doctrine After Kentucky v. King, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 17 (2012), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/notes/092012/Levick.pdf.
101
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863 (providing the following example of a threat to
violate the Fourth Amendment: “announcing [prior to the exigency] that [the police]
would break down the door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily”).
102
The Court’s rule simply includes “threatened,” without any explicit
mention of the type of the threat required. Id. at 1862 (“[T]he exigent circumstances
rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). By omitting a requirement that a
threat must be expressly made, it appears as if an implied threat would suffice. See
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 6.5(b) (“Given the emphasis in King on occupants’
entitlement to stand on their constitutional rights, one would think that even implied
threats would suffice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 (rejecting the respondent’s test, which proposed
that police “impermissibly create an exigency when they engage in conduct that would
cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Under the respondent’s proposed test, the “officers’ tone of
voice” and “the forcefulness of their knocks” would be relevant factors. Id. The Court
rejected this approach because police may have good reason to knock and announce
their presence loudly enough so that occupants are alerted as to their presence. Id. In
addition, the Court determined that this test would propose difficulty for both officers
in the field deciding “how loudly they may knock or announce their presence or how
forcefully they may knock,” and for lower courts “determin[ing] whether th[e] threshold
has been passed.” Id.
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we are left with a vague and contradictory view of the Court’s
holding that leaves significant room for interpretation.104
IV.

DEFINING THE SCOPE OF A THREATENED VIOLATION OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Kentucky v. King recognizes an inherent distinction
between an actual and a threatened violation of the Fourth
Amendment.105 To determine how an officer may threaten to
violate the Fourth Amendment, we first must address how an
officer may actually violate the Fourth Amendment.106
A.

Actual Violation of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment condemns any warrantless
search of a home,107 which the courts have treated as per se
unreasonable.108 This presumption can be overcome, however, if
104

LAFAVE, supra note 99, at § 6.5(b). Regarding the meaning of a threatened
violation of the Fourth Amendment, LaFave noted that “King unquestionably leaves
plenty of room for mischief.” Id.
105
See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (holding that the exigent-circumstance
doctrine “applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual
or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)).
106
This note focuses solely on Fourth Amendment violations within the
context of the home, and assumes that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. Yet
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure are not
limited to the home owner; the protections extend to anyone who “has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)
(citing, among others, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). The Court has
recognized certain scenarios where individuals may have a legitimate expectation of
privacy outside “their” home, such as an overnight guest in the home of another. See
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1990). Note, however, that the Fourth
Amendment protections are not attached to places, they are attached to people. Katz,
389 U.S. at 351; see also Kerr, supra note 33, at 810 (indicating that renters have
reasonable expectations of privacy in a rented home or apartment, and that similar
protections apply to hotel rooms and storage lockers). Therefore, even though this note
focuses solely on the home, Fourth Amendment protections do not solely depend on the
location of the individual—they apply when “the person invoking its protection can
claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been
invaded by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
107
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“Unreasonable searches or
seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of
the first clause of the [Fourth] Amendment.”).
108
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that searches and
seizures “conducted outside the judicial process” are “per se unreasonable”). Although
this note does not address the issue of consent, a warrantless search may be conducted
if consent is given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
Consent must be freely given such that it is not “coerced, by explicit or implicit means,
by implied threat or covert force.” Id. at 228.
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a legitimate exigent circumstance exists109 that renders a
“warrantless search . . . objectively reasonable.”110 Absent such
circumstances, then, a warrantless search and seizure results
in an actual violation of the Fourth Amendment111 by the
government112 and thereby infringes a constitutionally
recognized expectation of privacy.113
An actual violation is “fully accomplished” upon the
initial “unjustified governmental invasion” of a person’s
privacy;114 nevertheless, such invasions may occur under many
different circumstances. An unreasonable search may be
conducted during the classic physical search, where the police
physically enter a home and conduct a search in person.115 An
unreasonable search might also arise from the use of
technology that exposes “the details of the home,” without

109

For further information regarding legitimate exigent circumstances, see
supra notes 8 and 42.
110
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S 385, 394 (1978).
111
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 584. In Payton, the Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment has “two separate clauses, the first protecting
the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second
requiring that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause.” Id. This note
focuses only on Fourth Amendment violations in the context of unreasonable search
and seizure—Fourth Amendment violations in the issuing of warrants with probable
cause are beyond the scope of this analysis. It should be sufficient to note that “[t]he
Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only those deemed
unreasonable.” Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 158 (emphasis added).
112
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government—the Amendment does not protect against
private actions. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (“[The Fourth
Amendment] is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one,
effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any government official.’” (quoting Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
113
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting in the concurrence that the heart of a Fourth Amendment analysis in
determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy is whether a
person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy”).
114
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (“The purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable government intrusions into the
privacy of one’s person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is unjustified
governmental invasion of these areas of an individual’s life. That wrong . . . is fully
accomplished by the original search without probable cause.”).
115
For example, in King, law enforcement officials physically burst down the
door, physically entered the apartment, and conducted a physical search in person.
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[A]ny physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a
fraction of an inch,’ [is] too much.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
512 (1961))).
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physically intruding the home.116 (I will refer to such conduct as a
“constructive search.”) The Court has recognized constructive
searches in various settings, including the use of infrared thermal
imaging117 and electronic listening devices,118 and has even
accounted for new and more sophisticated technologies that may
be employed in the future.119
B.

Threatened Violation of the Fourth Amendment

During oral argument before the Court in Kentucky v.
King, certain justices expressed a concern that the various
tests adopted by lower courts would not invalidate a
warrantless search when officers demanded entry prior to the

116

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that the government’s warrantless use of
certain sense-enhancing technologies not “in general public use” violated Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure when it exposed
“details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion”); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he command of
the Fourth Amendment [should not] be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind
of electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be with whether the
privacy of the home was invaded.”); see also Kerr, supra note 33, at 804. Kerr indicates
that the concern of technology’s impact on privacy rights dates back to 1928 when
Justice Brandeis declared that “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Kerr further notes that the view that the
Fourth Amendment should account for advances in technology has been embraced by
legal theorists, constitutional scholars, and “nearly everyone else who has written on
the intersection of technology and criminal procedure.” Id.
117
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that the use of “Thermovision imaging”
was a search, and was “presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”).
118
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth can have no constitutional significance.
Id.
119

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 (“While the technology used in the present case was
relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or in development.”); id. at 40 (“Where . . . the Government uses
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). For further
information regarding the impact of technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
and for a discussion of the potential future impact of Kyllo on the Fourth Amendment
regarding the government’s use of technology, see Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72
MISS. L.J. 51 (2002).
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exigency.120 Justice Scalia even noted that an officer who gives
off the impression that he possesses a warrant and demands
entry is technically not violating the Fourth Amendment at that
very moment.121 This concern likely served as the justification
behind the Court’s inclusion of the “threatened violation” rhetoric
in the rule, based on a theory that law enforcement should not be
able to threaten behavior that would be inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment even though the assertion itself is not a
Fourth Amendment violation.122 In other words, the Court
seemed to recognize that a threatened violation of the Fourth
Amendment that creates an exigent circumstance ought not to
excuse the general warrant requirement in the same way that
a naturally arising exigency would.
C.

The “Reasonably Interpreted Threat Test”
1. The Test

Following King, lower courts have been left with the
task of determining what behavior sufficiently constitutes a
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.123 For the
reasons stated below, this note proposes that the lower courts
adopt the “Reasonably Interpreted Threat test.” Under this test, a
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment includes (1) any
assertion by a government official (verbal or physical), (2)
reasonably expressing (3) an intent to act in violation of the
Fourth Amendment (4) when viewed objectively under the totality
of the circumstances. This test resolves the ambiguity in King
regarding the scope of a threatened violation of the Fourth
120

See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849
(2011) (No. 09-1272). In particular, Justice Sotomayor asked, “What if the officers had
simply knocked, said ‘We’re going to kick the door in if you don’t open it’?” Id. at 15.
Following a similar threat, Justice Scalia asked, “Is it—is it unlawful? Is—is saying ‘Open
up, police,’ is that unlawful?” Id. at 33. Later, Justice Scalia asked, “Do you have any doubt
that it’s unlawful for a police officer to threaten to burst into a home?” Id. at 47.
121
Id. at 52 (“It wouldn’t technically be a Fourth Amendment violation, would
it, if the police gave the impression that they had a warrant and were about to kick in
the door? Is that a Fourth Amendment violation in and of itself?”)
122
See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011); Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 120, at 52.
123
See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 6.5(b) (stating that, post-King, the usual
question presented to the lower courts will be whether police conduct “deserves to be
characterized as a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment,” and whether or not a
threat has to be specific). The Supreme Court left open many questions for the lower
courts: Can a threat be implied or must it be explicit? What constitutes an implied
threat? What constitutes an express threat? Must a threat be verbalized, or can a
threat be express or implied through physical behavior?
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Amendment124 by treating any assertion—whether verbal or
physical, implied or express—as such a threat.
The justification is simple: the reasonableness standard
used to analyze actual violations of the Fourth Amendment
should also be used to analyze threatened violations of the
Fourth Amendment. The only difference in the analysis of an
actual and threatened violation is one additional step. In
determining whether law enforcement conducted an actual
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court must decide
whether an officer (1) engaged in behavior (2) that violates the
Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King added another link to this
chain: in determining whether law enforcement threatened to
violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court must decide whether
they (1) threatened (2) to engage in behavior (3) that violates the
Fourth Amendment. The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test
simply isolates the actual behavior alleged to constitute a
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment and subjects
that behavior to its own separate reasonableness analysis.
2. Explicit and Implied Threats
The Court’s holding in Kentucky v. King could be
interpreted to treat only explicit threats as a threatened
violation, based on the little guidance the Court offered in its
rejection of the respondent’s test125 and the one example it
provided.126 But when analyzing the holding, it becomes evident
that the Court’s rule can and must account for implied and
explicit threats.127 The Court’s holding explicitly states that the
124

See supra Part III for further discussion of the ambiguity in the Court’s holding.
The respondent’s proposed test accounted for implied threats as well as
explicit threats. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
126
The only additional example provided by the Court dealt with an explicit
threat. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Seeing that the court rejected the
respondent’s test accounting for implied threats, and included only one example
describing an explicit threat, it is likely that academics and lower courts will assume
that this test applies only to explicit threats—an assumption that this note rebuts. See
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 6.5(b). LaFave seems confident that, under the test in King, a
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment must be explicit, and he states that the
determination of whether or not such a threat exists will hinge on “the exact words
utilized by the police.” Id.
127
Several lower courts have already begun to address the issue of implied
threats; however, no court has tackled the application of implied threats head on. For
example, in a Tenth Circuit case, the defendant argued that the “show of military
force . . . clearly implied that if there was no compliance with [the police’s] demands the
Fourth Amendment would be violated.” United States v. Ramirez-Fragozo, 490 F.
App’x 125, 128-29 (10th Cir. 2012). The Tenth Circuit did not state that such conduct
was incapable of constituting a threat; rather, they dismissed this argument on the
125
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“exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when
the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable
[under the Fourth Amendment],”128 and when police did not create
the exigency by “threatening to engage in conduct that violates
the Fourth Amendment.”129 The Court suggests that a
reasonableness analysis focuses on police conduct preceding the
exigency (which would include the alleged threat) without any
distinction made as to the means by which that threat was
asserted. Thus, certain implied or non-verbal conduct may
reasonably express a Fourth Amendment violation just as well as
explicit verbal assertions. For example, if a police officer bangs
loudly on a door, and yells “open up, or else,” the ambiguity of
the term “or else” indicates that there is no express threat to
violate the Fourth Amendment: “or else” may mean “or else I’m
going to kick the door in” (a threat to violate the Fourth
Amendment) or “or else” may mean “or else I am going to walk
away and seek a warrant from an impartial magistrate” (no
threat, but rather reasonable police conduct). The ambiguity
here may indicate that, under the proposed test, this is not an
objectively reasonable threat to violate the Fourth Amendment.
But if the officer yelled “open up, or else,” and placed a doorbreaching ram up against the door, the circumstances may
make this an objectively viewed threat to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Such implied threats should be subject to a
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.
Although the Court usually expresses a preference for
bright line rules clearly indicating what type of behavior is
permissible,130 the rule in King does not accomplish this.131
ground that there was “no evidence that the occupants were aware of the extent of the
police presence or felt threatened.” Id. at 129. The District Court in Utah even
appeared to directly address the issue of implied threats when they held that police
threatened to violate the Fourth Amendment when “they attempted to enter [a hotel]
room with [a] key card” prior to the exigency. United States v. Estrada, No. 1:11-CR101 TS, 2012 WL 2367992, at *6 (D. Utah June 21, 2012).
128
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
129
Id.
130
See Maclin, supra note 119, at 69-71. Maclin indicates that modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence expresses a preference for bright line rules over balancing
tests, and provides a list of seven cases supporting this proposition. Id.
131
An example of a bright line rule is that in Minnesota v. Olson, where the
Court “held that an overnight guest is entitled to rely on the privacy of his host’s
home.” Id. at 69 n.98 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1989)). This is a
bright line rule because it provides clear guidance as to the privacy protection afforded
to an overnight guest. The rule in King is not a bright line rule because it does not
explicitly state the conduct sufficient to constitute a threat. See King, 131 S. Ct. at
1861. A bright line rule would thus state an “explicit verbal threat,” not just “threat”
alone.
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Therefore, for the sake of “provid[ing] ample protection for the
privacy rights that the [Fourth] Amendment protects,”132 the
lower courts should subject any threat—implied or express,
verbal or non-verbal—to an objective reasonableness review by
considering the threat under the totality of the circumstances.
V.

THE REASONABLY INTERPRETED THREAT TEST FLOWS
DIRECTLY FROM FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
AND KENTUCKY V. KING

The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test draws support
directly from the Court’s analysis in a long line of Fourth
Amendment cases on the subject and preserves the goals the
Court sought to achieve in Kentucky v. King. In addition, the
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test adequately responds to many
concerns expressed by the Court regarding the respondent’s
proposed test in King.133 The lower courts should thus adopt the
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test when analyzing the
destruction of evidence exigency and the police-created
exigency doctrine.
A.

Consistency with Kentucky v. King

The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test promotes the
Court’s desire for consistency. The Court in King expressed a
concern for consistency by basing its inquiry upon the
justification for warrantless search and seizure in the first
place: Fourth Amendment reasonableness.134 The Court
supported its holding by comparing the reasonableness test to
tests adopted by the Court in other warrantless search and
seizure scenarios, including, for example, the tests for the

132
133
134

King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858.

Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts, the answer to the
question presented in this case follows directly and clearly from the principle
that permits warrantless searches in the first place. As previously noted,
warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it
reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with
the warrant requirement. Therefore, the . . . exigent circumstances rule
justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the
exigency is reasonable in the same sense.
Id. at 1857-58.
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seizure of evidence in plain view135 and consent-based
encounters.136 Moreover, the Court’s adoption of a purely
objective standard that ignores subjective state of mind is
consistent with historical Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.137
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test preserves the
Court’s preference for objective review,138 analyzes the threat
under the totality of the circumstances,139 and subjects the
behavior (the alleged threat) to the reasonableness analysis that
is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.140 Reasonableness
“permeates most Fourth Amendment doctrines” and serves as
the “substantive command of the Fourth Amendment.”141 Fourth

135

Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 140 (1990)) (stating
police “may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the
Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence
is made”). The Court further indicated that the subjective intent of the officer is
irrelevant in determining whether the seizure was justified; all that matters is whether
the officer violated the Fourth Amendment in reaching the location where the evidence
was seized. Id.
136
Id. (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n.5 (1984)) (stating that an
officer “may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place
where the consensual encounter occurs”). For example, if an officer has not violated the
Fourth Amendment in reaching their location, he or she may seek consensual
encounters with an individual. Id. The Court further explained that, in such an instance
where “consent is freely given,” the subjective intent of the officer in approaching the
individual is irrelevant to a determination of the encounter’s validity. Id.
137
Id. at 1859 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted)) (holding that Fourth Amendment case law has
“repeatedly rejected a subjective approach,” and that a test based on reasonableness is
generally objective). For arguments in support of an objective standard prior to the
holding in King, see generally Bryan M. Abramoske, Note, It Doesn’t Matter What They
Intended: The Need for Objective Permissibility Review of Police-Created Exigencies in
“Knock and Talk” Investigations, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 561 (2008).
138
See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 136, 138)
(“‘[E]ven-handed law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the officer.’”); supra notes 27, 137 and accompanying text.
139
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is an objective measure viewed under
the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Analyzing
the threat under the totality of the circumstances is consistent with the review applied
to determine the validity of an exigent circumstance: When determining whether the
exigencies of the situation make a warrantless search objectively reasonable, the courts
are essentially analyzing whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a legitimate
exigency was present. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (“[W]arrants are
generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the
situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
140
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness.”); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”).
141
Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 158.
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Amendment reasonableness informs warrant requirements,142
legitimate expectations of privacy,143 the exigent-circumstances
rule,144 and now, the police-created exigency doctrine.145 As such,
behavior alleged to constitute a threatened violation of the Fourth
Amendment should receive the same reasonableness review.146
Doing so maintains a doctrinal consistency, offering relatively clear
guidelines for both citizens and law enforcement officers.
Similar to the Court’s holding in King, the Reasonably
Interpreted Threat test does not require analysis of the
“foreseeable” mental response of the occupant of a premises, thus
reducing the burden on law enforcement officials in the field.147 In
addition, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test recognizes that
a warrantless search may occasionally be justified, even in
situations where police could have sufficiently demonstrated
probable cause to obtain a warrant and had time to do so.148
142

See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (noting that warrantless searches and
seizures are presumptively unreasonable) (emphasis added); see also Raigrodski, supra
note 3, at 158. Dr. Raigrodski argues:
The concept of reasonableness permeates most Fourth Amendment doctrines,
such as the reasonable expectations of privacy, reasonable suspicion, and
reasonable person standards. More importantly, reasonableness operates as
the overarching norm of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
does not denounce all searches and seizures, but only those deemed
unreasonable, and reasonableness is set forth as the ultimate constitutional
standard. Reasonableness is both the substantive command of the Fourth
Amendment and its preferred methodology, and is the meta-narrative of
search and seizure law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
143
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting in the concurrence that the heart of a Fourth Amendment analysis in
determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy is whether a person
has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” (emphasis added)).
144
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (“One well-recognized exception [to the warrant
requirement] applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.” (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)).
145
Id. at 1858 (“[When] . . . the police [do] not create the exigency by engaging
or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth amendment, warrantless entry
to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” (emphasis added)).
146
Id. (“[T]he exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when
the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable . . . .” (emphasis added));
see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (“The touchstone of our
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’”
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))).
147
See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (recognizing that law enforcement officials are
placed in scenarios where they must make split-second decisions, and that forcing officials
to determine the foreseeable responses to their tactics would create great difficulty).
148
See id. (recognizing many legitimate reasons why police may not seek a
warrant as soon as probable cause is established, and providing examples).
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Therefore, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test is consistent
with the Court’s goal of promoting investigative efficiency because
it does not require police to halt every investigation the very
instant that they obtain the minimum amount of evidence
necessary for establishing probable cause,149 a duty found
nowhere in the Constitution.150
Moreover, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test
provides “ample protection for the privacy rights [guaranteed
by] . . . the Fourth Amendment” that the holding in Kentucky v.
King sought to further.151 The Court states that the rule
announced in King does not in any way reduce an individual’s
Fourth Amendment privacy rights because when an officer does
“no more than any private citizen might do” by knocking on a
door of a premises and requesting to speak with its occupant.152
In response, “the occupant [would have] no obligation to open
the door or to speak” because the test applies entirely to the
conduct of the police and poses no obligation on the occupant.153
An occupant that does open the door, however, can still deny
entry or refuse to answer any questions.154 Under the Reasonably
Interpreted Threat test, then, a mere knock upon a door of a
premises followed by a request to speak to its occupant would
not constitute a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment,
especially under an objective reasonableness standard. By
contrast, an officer could not follow a knock and request to
speak by banging on the door and violently screaming “open up
or else!” Further, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test still
enables the exigent circumstances doctrine to survive because a
warrantless search is still justified when occupants respond to
lawful police behavior by “attempt[ing] to destroy evidence.”155

149

Id. at 1860-61 (“[L]aw enforcement officers are under no constitutional
duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum
evidence to establish probable cause.” (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
310 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
150
Id. at 1861 (“Faulting the police for failing to apply for a search warrant at
the earliest possible time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is
nowhere to be found in the Constitution.”).
151
Id. at 1862 (“This holding provides ample protection for the privacy rights
that the [Fourth] Amendment protects.”).
152
Id. (“When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant
knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do.”).
153
Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983)).
154
Id.
155
Id. (“Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but
instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the
warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.”).

1514

B.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

Consistency with Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test comports with
the Court’s analysis of Fourth Amendment issues outside the
context of Kentucky v. King. In particular, recognition of both
explicit and implicit threatened violations remains consistent
with the Court’s similar understanding that Fourth Amendment
violations can arise both through physical and constructive
means.156 For instance, police can conduct a search either by
physically entering a home or by “constructively” searching it
through the use of technology.157 Any warrantless search that
violates that is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment,
irrespective of the means employed by law enforcement in doing
so.158 Similarly, a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment does
not become less of a threat simply because it is implied rather
than explicitly stated.
In addition, recognition of both explicit and implied
threats parallels the Supreme Court’s analysis in determining
whether an individual has freely consented to a police search.159
When analyzing the validity of consent, a court must determine
whether the consent was the product of coercion by law
enforcement.160 A court must make this determination by
assessing the totality of the circumstances.161 Under the totality
approach, “consent must not be coerced, by explicit or implicit

156

See supra Part. IV.A.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[R]easonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical
invasion.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
158
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961). The
determination of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation “is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” not the type of
surveillance microphones used to intrude. Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 33, at 804. Kerr
indicates that the concern of technologies impact on privacy rights dates back to 1928
when Justice Brandeis declared that “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
159
Consent to search has been recognized by the Court as a valid exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 55960 (2004).
160
In order for consent to a search to be valid, it must be voluntarily given.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment “require[s] that a consent not be coerced”).
161
Id. at 229 (noting that the Court will “examine all the surrounding
circumstances to determine” the voluntariness of consent).
157

2013]

DEFINING A THREAT

1515

means, [or] by implied threat or covert force”162 because any
coercion, “no matter how subtl[e],” would result in unjustified police
intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment.163 The Reasonably
Interpreted Threat test follows from the same reasoning because
an entry gained by a threatened Fourth Amendment violation,
whether explicit or implicit, would still result in an unreasonable
police intrusion that violates the Fourth Amendment.164
C.

Concerns From the Respondent’s Proposed Test

The
respondent’s
proposed
test
contained
a
reasonableness element that appeared to account for implied
threats.165 Although the Court was unwilling to accept this
particular formulation, this does not suggest that the Court
intended to create a blanket exception rejecting all implied
threats. On the surface, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test
may appear similar to the test proposed by the respondent, given
that both focus on the question of reasonableness. However, upon
closer inspection, crucial differences exist that render the
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test starkly different from
respondent’s test, while remaining consistent with the Court’s
holding in Kentucky v. King.
The respondent’s test contained a component of
foreseeability that the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test does
not. The foreseeability component troubled the Court because
the test emphasized reasonableness both with respect to the
conduct of the police and the foreseeable mental effect of that
conduct on the occupant.166 A critical issue arises with the
foreseeability component because Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analysis focuses solely on the conduct of the
government, not the “foreseeable” mental response of the
162

Id. at 228.
Id.
164
The Court in Schneckloth based part of its reasoning on the belief that the
Court should protect against even subtle intrusions on constitutional protections. Id. at
228-29 (“[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. . . . It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635
(1886) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
165
See supra note 103.
166
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011). The respondent’s test
asked whether a reasonable person would believe entry to be “imminent and
inevitable,” thus placing the focus of the analysis on what a reasonable occupant would
foresee the police doing. Id. The Court has already expressed discontent with adopting
a foreseeability component because of the potential for unpredictability. Id. at 1859.
163
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respondent.167 Contrary to the respondent’s proposed test, the
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test focuses solely on the
conduct of law enforcement, paying no attention to what a
reasonable person would believe the police are actually about
to do.168 Therefore, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test does
not require the courts to assume the daunting and unpractical
task of attempting to gauge foreseeability,169 thus avoiding the
“unacceptable degree of unpredictability”170 that plagued the
respondent’s proposed test.
In addition to the fatal foreseeability requirement, the
respondent’s test failed because of the insufficiency of the
factors it considered when determining whether a reasonable
person would believe entry was imminent and inevitable.171 As
such, the test did not fail because of any sort of disagreement
that the Court may have held with the application of implied
threats.172 The Court believed that any need to consider the tone
of voice and forcefulness of knocks would place a great burden
on both law enforcement and the lower courts.173 Along those
lines, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
require [such a] nebulous and impractical test.”174 However,
under the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test, a police officer
could bang on a door as loud as possible, screaming “Police!
Police!” without necessarily violating the Fourth Amendment
because, viewed alone, this conduct would not constitute a
threat.
Because the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test applies
a totality of the circumstances approach, the courts could at
times consider tone of voice and forcefulness of knocks even
167

The Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches and
seizures conducted by the government, not private individuals. See supra note 112. In
addition, the Court in King recognized that, when determining whether the exigent
circumstance rule applies, attention must be paid to the reasonableness of the police
conduct preceding the exigency. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858.
168
The focus on the reasonableness of police conduct alone is consistent with
the Court’s holding in King. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (“[T]he exigent circumstances rule
justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is
reasonable in the same sense.” (emphasis added)).
169
See id. at 1859-60 (providing examples illustrating the difficulty of such a task).
170
Id. at 1859.
171
See id. at 1861.
172
The Court noted that if it had adopted the respondent’s test, it would
create difficulty for law enforcement and the lower courts; however, the Court did not say
that implied threats in general are insufficient to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
173
Id. (noting how respondent’s test would propose difficulty for law
enforcement in determining how loud they may announce their presence, and for the
courts in determining whether or not such a threshold has been passed).
174
Id.

2013]

DEFINING A THREAT

1517

though this conduct would not be viewed as a threat on its own.
Such conduct would play into a court’s analysis under the
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test, particularly when
accompanied by a vague statement (“open up or you will regret
it”175) or a suggestive act (placing lock pick in the cylinder of the
door176). This is true because a vague statement or suggestive action
could very well reasonably assert a threat to engage in conduct
that would violate the Fourth Amendment because both would
indicate an officer’s intent to open the door in the absence of
consent by the suspect. In contrast to the respondent’s
proposed test, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test analyzes
only whether a reasonable person would reasonably interpret
the police conduct to threated a Fourth Amendment violation.
Because reasonableness analysis stands as “the touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment,”177 this test is thus far from “nebulous
and impractical.”
D.

Examples to Provide Guidance

The chart below provides some examples of how police
conduct could be analyzed under the Reasonably Interpreted
Threat test. These examples demonstrate the spectrum of
actions that lie between the “no threat” and “explicit threat”
categories.178 The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test would
provide a principled framework for analyzing this middle
ground police behavior.

175

Other examples of such vague verbal expressions include statements like
“open up, or else,” and “open up, this is your last chance.” Note how these statements
are inherently different from simply announcing police presence, or requesting to speak
with the occupant. The statements suggest that some action may be taken if the
occupant does not comply, such as breaking down the door. Therefore, while the
statements may not explicitly contain a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment (such
as “open up or I will kick the door in”)—because the former statements can be construed
to mean “open up, or else we will get a warrant”—they may have the same effect by
reasonably asserting an impermissible threat under the totality of the circumstances.
176
Other examples of such suggestive actions could include lining up a door
ram, or cocking back the action of a shotgun with a door-breaching muzzle attached.
Similar to vague verbal expressions, these actions suggest that some action, such as
breaching the door, may be taken if the occupant does not comply.
177
See supra note 140.
178
Note, however, that this is not an exhaustive list; rather, this list simply
contains several examples of a potentially limitless set of facts.
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CONCLUSION
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test will,
concededly, place a small requirement on law enforcement to
think a little deeper about their actions and word choice before
approaching a home. This slight burden on law enforcement,
however, does not present a legitimate reason to abandon an
objective reasonableness requirement.179 While it would be
179

The privacy protections granted by the Fourth Amendment “may not be
totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal
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easier to interpret the Court’s holding as establishing a brightline rule classifying only explicit verbal statements as threats,
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,
not pure simplicity. The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test
does not aim to take the easy way out, but instead seeks to
achieve the best possible balance between constitutionally
protected privacy rights and investigative efficiency. Making
minor adaptations to investigative procedure can mitigate this
slight burden. For example, states can draft department-wide
policies prohibiting certain vague verbal expressions or conduct
that expresses a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment when
approaching a home. The now-or-never scenarios encountered
by law enforcement may require police to make split-second
decisions.180 But these decisions still must be made rationally
and in accordance with the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment and the police-created exigency doctrine. Using
the framework of the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test, law
enforcement can adopt guidelines and procedural requirements
without having to guess what might constitute an
impermissible threat.181 The proposed test permits actions that
law enforcement may have good reason to take182 while
forbidding actions that amount to threats to go beyond the
constitutional limits of the police-created exigency doctrine and
the Fourth Amendment.
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181
Law enforcement can instruct against the use of certain verbal or physical
assertions reasonably interpreted as a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment, such
as a ban on the use of ambiguous demands like “open up or else” or the placement of a
battering ram at the door of an individual’s home.
182
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 (noting that law enforcement “may have a very
good reason” to knock loudly and to identify themselves to citizens).
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